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RECENT DECISIONS

Many cases are cited by the defense to show that estoppel should be
applied, but they are all distinguished in the instant case by the court
on the grounds that, (1) the marital status of the parties is directly
involved and no pecuniary considerations are presented; 18 (2) New
York State is the marital domicile and is therefore a party to the
transaction; 19 (3) the
plaintiff did not seek to impeach a decree
20
obtained in his favor.

S. C. S.

FACTOR'S AcT-APPLICATION-PROPERTY

OBTAINED

BY COM-

MON LAW LARCENY.-The plaintiff, a jeweler, intrusted a diamond
ring to an employee to sell to a stated person at a stated price. Pursuant to a preconceived plan to convert the ring, the employee pawned

it with the defendant, the latter acting in good faith. In an action
to recover possession of the ring, held, for the plaintiff. The Factor's
Act 1 is no defense to an action by an owner to recover possession
31; Purrington, Of Matrimonial Actions as Equity Suits and of the Pleadings
Therein (1909) 9 COL. L. Rav. 321; cf. Brown v. Brown, 153 App. Div. 645,
138 N. Y. Supp. 602 (1st Dept. 1912) (where the plaintiff was a woman who
married the defendant, knowing he was already married, it was held that the
marriage was absolutely void and that relief could not be refused). This case
limits Berry v. Berry, supra, to the point where a guilty party seeks the aid of
a court of equity to relieve himself from his own wrongdoing, and is based on
Stokes v. Stokes, 198 N. Y. 301. 91 N. E. 793 (1910). However, the cases of
Brown v. Brown, supra and Stokes v. Stokes, supra, virtually overrule Berry v.
Berry, supra. There are a large number of cases holding that estoppel should
be applied, but they are merely dicta, as in those cases the action was for annulment under Section 7 of the Domestic Relations Law which deals with voidable
marriages. Rubman v. Rubman, 140 Misc. 658, 251 N. Y. Supp. 474 (1931)
(annulment for fraud) ; Pettit v. Pettit, 105 App. Div. 312, 93 N. Y. Supp.
1001 (3d Dept. 1905) (court granted an annulment decree here, saying, however,
that it may be refused for equitable reasons) ; Taylor v. Taylor, 63 App. Div.
231, 71 N. Y. Supp. 411 (1st Dept. 1901), aff'd, 173 N. Y. 266, 65 N. E. 1098
(1903) (decree refused here, but marriage was voidable and not void).
'Brown v. Brown, 242 App. Div. 33, 272 N. Y. Supp. 877 (4th Dept.
1934), aft'd, 266 N. Y. 532, 195 N. E. 186 (1935) (action on a contract made
at time of marriage).
'x Hubbard v. Hubbard, 228 N. Y. 81, 86, 126 N. E. 508, 509 (1920): "The
State of New York was not a party to any of the marital transactions of the
parties involved in this action." The annulment was herein refused.
' Starbuck v. Starbuck, 173 N. Y. 503, 508, 66 N. E. 193, 194 (1903) : "A
party * * * may not be heard to impeach a decree * * * which he himself has
procured * * * in his own favor."
N. Y. P-Rs. PROP. LAW § 43: "Every .factor or other agent, * * * not

having the documentary evidence of title, who shall be intrusted with the
possession of any merchandise for the purpose of sale * * * shall be deemed to
be the true owner thereof, so far as to give validity to any contract made by
such agent with any other person, for the sale or disposition of * * * such
merchandise for any money advanced *** by such other person upon the faith
thereof."
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of personal property obtained from him by common law larceny.
Sweet and Co. v. Provident Loan Society, 279 N. Y. 540, 18 N. E.
(2d) 847 (1939).
Under the common law, a person who dealt with a factor was
'bound to take notice of the general extent of his powers.2 Thus a
factor or agent, whether in possession of the goods themselves or of
a document of title, could not pass a good title to a third person by a
sale 3 or pledge,4 unless authority, in fact, had been conferred upon
him by the true owner. 5 If the factor did wrongfully dispose of the
goods or the proceeds of the sale*of the same, the principal could follow and recover them from anyone into whose hands they had come. 6
To alleviate the apparent hardship caused third parties by the operation of this rule, remedial statutes, known as the Factor Acts, were
enacted. 7 In order to bring a case within the purview of the New
York Factor's Act,8 the person dealing with the factor and claiming
2Foerder

v. Tradesman's Nat. Bank, 107 Fed. 219 (C. C. A. 2d, 1901);

Winslow v. Slaton, 150 N. C. 264, 63 S. E. 950 (1909) ; Western Union Telephone Co. v. Peter, 160 S. W. 991 (1913) (a purchaser through a factor is
chargeable with knowledge of the custom of factors to follow the instructions
of their principals, and is bound thereby).
'Halsey v. Bird, 99 Fed. 525 (C. C. A. 4th, 1900); Romeo v. Martucci,
72 Conn. 504, 45 AtI. 1 (1900); Hogan v. Shorb, 24 Wend. 458 (N. Y. 1840) ;
Cook v. Beal, 14 N. Y. Super. Ct. 497 (1857) ; Winslow v. Slaton, 150 N. C.
264, 63 S. E. 950 (1909).
'Brown v. Robinson, 2 Caines Cas. 341 (N. Y. 1791) ; Hogan v. Shorb,
24 Wend. 458 (N. Y. 1840) ; Bliss v. Bliss, 20 N. Y. Super. Ct. 339 (1860);
Judson v. Stillwell, 26 How. Pr. 513 (N. Y. 1864).
'The only exceptions to this rule were found in the cases where the principal ratified the factor's act, or so clothed the factor with apparent authority
as to be estopped from proclaiming his lack of authority against an innocent
purchaser for value. Abel Bros. and Co. v. Chase, 90 Conn. 487, 97 Atl. 762
(1916) ("In Connecticut the common law rule still prevails that a factor's
unauthorized sale of his principal's goods confers no title on an innocent purchaser for value unless the principal ratifies the sale or by his own act has
clothed the factor with an appearance of ownership beyond that involved in an
ordinary contract of consignment"); Automobile, etc. Co. v. Motor Finance
Co., 79 Misc. 37, 138 N. Y. Supp. 1016 (1913); McCarthy v. Crawford, 238
Ill. 38, 86 N. E. 750 (1908); Norris v. Boston Music Co., 129 Minn. 198, 151
N. W. 971 (1915) ; Smith v. Jefferson Bank, 147 Mo. App. 461, 126 S. W. 810
(1910).
'Seymour v. Wychoff, 10 N. Y. 213 (1851); Duguid v. Edwards, 50 Barb.
288 (N. Y. 1867); Baker v. N. Y. National Exchange Bank, 100 N. Y. 31,
2 N. E. 452 (1885) ; Britton v. Ferrin, 171 N. Y. 235, 63 N. E. 954 (1902).
"The first such statute was enacted in England. St. 6 Geo. IV c. 94 (1823),
and was supplemented by 5 & 6 Vict. c. 39, and 491 & 41 Vict. c. 34. Finally
the entire preceding legislation was amended and consolidated in 52 & 53 Vict.
c. 45 (1889), entitled the Factor's Act.
In Massachusetts a similar statute was enacted by the Acts of 1849, c. 193.
This provision provided that a factor in possession of goods should be deemed
the true owner so far as to give validity to any bona fide contract made for the
sale of the same, but did not protect a pledge of such factor. Michigan State
Bank v. Gardner, 15 Gray 362 (Mass. 1860). The subsequent Act of 1849,
c. 216, § 3, extended the protection of the statute to pledges by such factors or
agents.
" See note 1, supra.
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the protection of the statute must have acted in good faith, i.e., without knowledge of the factor's lack of authority; t also, possession of
the property upon which the third party relied, must have been obtained by the factor with the consent of the owner, 10 and without
fraud. 1 If, as in the instant case, the possession was obtained through
common law larceny, there being no consent, the statute is inapplicable.1 2 In some jurisdictions where the factor is instructed to
sell the goods to a stated person for a stated price the Factor's Acts
have been held not to apply.'3 Although such was the fact in the instant
case the court did not touch upon it, apparently, preferring to rest its
decision upon the fact that the property 'was obtained through common
law larceny. Where the statute has been found not to apply, the common law prevails,1 4 and the only remedy available to the defrauded
third party, who has had property taken from him by its true owner
would seem to lie in an action against the factor for the return of the
purchase money and the expenses incurred in defending his title.' 5
The obvious inadequacy of this relief, and the unreasonableness of the
rule which places the loss upon the third party when the property is
obtained by common law larceny,' 6 and upon the owner when it is
In some jurisdictions a person dealing with a factor is not deprived of the
protection of the statute because he is cognizant of the identity of the factor as
such, if he acts bona fide and without notice that the factor is acting inala fide
and beyond his authority. Price v. Wisconsin M. and F. Ins. Co., 43 Wis. 267
(1877). But in New York mere notice that the factor or agent holds the goods
as such has been held sufficient to take the case out of the protection of the
statute. Stevens v. Wilson, 6 Hill 512 (N. Y. 1844); cf. Pegram v. Carson,
23 N. Y. Super. Ct. 505 (1863); see Kingston Cotton Mills v. Kuline, 129 App.
Div. 250, 130 N. Y. Supp. 799 (1st Dept. 1908) (where it was held that a mere
suspicion that the factor or agent is not the owner of the goods is not sufficient
to put him on inquiry and charge him with the knowledge such inquiry would
have solicited).
"Toledo First Nat. Bank v. Shaw, 61 N. Y. 283 (1874) ; Kinsey v. Liggett, 71 N. Y. 387 (1877). "The act was not intended to deprive actual owners
who had not parted with their title, or who by fraud and without fault on their
part had lost control over it."
But possession acquired through negligence on the part of the owner is not
sufficient; negligence is not consent. Hazard v. Fiske, 18 Hun 277, aff'd, 83
N. Y. 287 (1830); Toledo First Nat. Bank v. Shaw, supra; Sage v. Shepard
Lumber Co., 4 App. Div. 290, 39 N. Y. Supp. 449 (3d Dept. 1896), aff'd, 158
N. Y. 672 mem., 52 N. E. 1126.
U Prentice v. Page, 164 Mass. 276, 41 N. E. 279 (1895) ; Hentz v. Miller,
94 N. Y. 63 (1883) ; Soltan v. Gerdan, 119 N. Y. 380, 23 N. E. 864 (1890).
' Soltan v. Gerdan, 119 N. Y. 380, 23 N. E. 864 (1890); Schmidt v.
Simpson, 204 N. Y. 434, 97 N. E.966 (1912) ; Stone v. Provident Loan Society,
260 N. Y. 536, 184 N. E. 82 (1932). Contra: Oppenheimer v. Frazier and
Wyatt, 1 K. B. 519 (1907).
"Heilbronn v. McAbenan, 49 Hun 607 (N. Y. 1888); Prentice v. Page,
164 Mass. 276, 41 N. E. 279 (1895); Collateral Loan Co. v. Sallinger, 195
Mass. 135, 80 N. E. 811 (1907).
ABonita v. Masquera, 15 N. Y. Super. Ct. 401 (1858) ; Toledo First Nat.
Bank v. Shaw, 61 N. Y. 283 (1874).
'Burt v. Dewey, 40 N. Y. 283 (1869) ; Edgerton v. Michels, 66 Wis. 124,
26 N. W. 748 (1885).
'See note 12, supra.
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obtained through embezzlement,' 7 was recognized by the court in the
instant case as perhaps not justified by the terms of the statute.' 8 But
feeling itself constrained to follow prior decisions, the court refused
to make a change without legislative authority.19 It would seem the
court lost sight of the fact that past decisions are to be treated as
merely indicative of the trend of judicial behavior rather than as
binding precedent.
J. R. P.

JURISDICTION-BURDEN

ON

INTERSTATE

COMMERCE-SUIT

IN

NEW YORK-ACTION ACCRUING IN UTAH.-The plaintiffs bring this

action for the wrongful death of their brother who was killed while a
passenger on one of the defendant carrier's airplanes. The crash occurred near Salt Lake City in the State of Utah. One of the plaintiffs is
a bona fide resident of New York State; the other is a resident of Minnesota. The defendant, appearing specially, has moved to set aside service of the summons and complaint on the ground that (1) it is not
doing business within this state to the extent necessary to subject it to
the jurisdiction of the court; and (2) even if it is carrying on business
here, to compel defense of the action in the State of New York would
be imposing an undue burden on interstate commerce. Held, the order
of Supreme Court granting defendant's motion to set aside service,
reversed. The defendant's activities show that it is doing business
within this state, and that it is subject to service of process here. Moreover, there is no merit to the defendant's contention that a suit between these parties in a New York court is an unreasonable burden
on interstate commerce. Jensen v. United Air Lines Transport Corp.,
255 App. Div. 611, 8 N. Y. S. (2d) 374 (1st Dept. 1938).
Torts are transitory actions I and can be prosecuted, generally,
in any state where the courts have jurisdiction over the parties.2 . Although a plaintiff has become a resident of this state subsequent to
the time when his cause of action arose outside the state, and defendant is a foreign corporation, the courts of this state may not refuse
" Sanette Corp. v. Sanette Corp. of New England, 132 Misc. 455, 230 N. Y.
Supp. 102 (1928) (where the factor obtains possession of goods rightfully and
then conceives a plan to convert the same to his own use, the Factor's Act is
applicable). It would, therefore, seem that the absence or presence of an
animus furandi at the time the factor obtained possession of the goods is the
criterion as to the statute's applicability in this class of cases.
8 Instant case at 545.
" Ibid.
BURDICK, TORTS (4th ed. 1926) 256-260; EDGAR AND EDGAR, TORTS (3d ed

1936) 104.

2 Crashley

v. Press Publishing Co., 179 N. Y. 27, 71 N. E. 258 (1904).

